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Abstract
In discussions of the Aharonov-Bohm effect, Healey and Lyre have attributed re-
ality to loops σ0 (or hoops [σ0]), since the electromagnetic potentialA is currently
unmeasurable and can therefore be transformed. I argue that [A] = [A+ dλ]λ and
the hoop [σ0] are related by a meaningful duality, so that however one feels about
[A] (or any potential A ∈ [A]), it is no worse than [σ0] (or any loop σ0 ∈ [σ0]): no
ontological firmness is gained by retreating to the loops, which are just as flimsy
as the potentials. And one wonders how the unmeasurability of one entity can in-
vest another with physical reality; would an eventual observation ofA dissolve σ0,
consigning it to a realm of incorporeal mathematical abstractions?
The reification of loops rests on the potential’s “gauge dependence”; which in
turn rests on its unmeasurability; which is too shaky and arbitrary a notion to carry
so much weight.
1 Introduction
Thales, one gathers, had nothing but water; then came atoms, fire, air, earth, effluvia,
fields, energy, waves and other complications. The history of ontological speculation
(to say nothing of my garden, §5) has now been enriched by loops—and perhaps other
boundaries too (§6).
The Aharonov-Bohm effect1 (§2) involves a relationship between variations in the
current through a solenoid and changes in the interference pattern on a screen. The re-
lationship is puzzling, but one can try to make sense of it in various ways. Of the avail-
able elements (electromagnetic field F in the solenoid, loops enclosing the solenoid,
wavefunction ψ, electromagnetic potential A, its circulation C around the loops, in-
terference pattern P , topological features), some can be chosen, others left out—with
inevitable philosophical tradeoffs. Accounts emphasizing the relationship between ψ
or P and F (rather than A) have been found disturbingly nonlocal;2 those preferring3
1Ehrenberg & Siday (1949), Aharonov & Bohm (1959); see also Franz (1939, 1940, 1965), Olariu &
Popescu (1985), Hiley (2013).
2Aharonov & Bohm (1959) p. 490: “we might try to formulate a nonlocal theory in which, for example,
the electron could interact with a field that was a finite distance away. Then there would be no trouble in
interpreting these results, but, as is well known, there are severe difficulties in the way of doing this.” See
also Healey (1997).
3Aharonov & Bohm (1959) pp. 490-1: “we may retain the present local theory and [ . . . ] try to give
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A to F seem more local, but are vitiated by the kernel of d : A 7→ F = dA, which
produces the troublesome freedom
(1) [A+ dλ]λ = d
−1F
eliminated by d.
A central notion here will be measurability: F and C can be measured, but not
A—for the time being at any rate (but see §7). Indeed measurability is a complicated
matter: what’s unmeasurable today may not be tomorrow (or vice versa); it depends on
the current state of science, technology, ingenuity, economics and so forth; resources,
instruments, capabilities and possibilities available in one space-time region may not
be in another. In §7 we’ll see that it can even depend on the way one feels about
a rule. I’ll avoid the most absolute notion of measurability, as being too abstract to
countenance, and will sometimes include a specification in square brackets: unmea-
surable[today], measurability[Tuesday] or [with respect to theoretical stipulation S],
unmeasurability[given the resources available in space-time regionR] or [with respect
to instrument ι] and so forth. Different contexts require different notions of measur-
ability; no notion will be given an absolute primacy, which transcends context. So I
should really say something like “A is unmeasurable[now]” or “A is unmeasurable[in
the current state of science and technology].” How can one know that “A will never
be measured” or “A is unmeasurable in principle”? Maudlin (1998, p. 367) writes that
“since potentials which differ by a gauge transformation generate identical effects, no
amount amount of observation could reveal the ONE TRUE GAUGE,” which I take to
mean “since potentials which differ by a gauge transformation generate identical ef-
fects for the time being, no amount amount of observation[now] could reveal the ONE
TRUE GAUGE.”4
This is related to the matter of invariance under certain transformations. The point
is not that A can be transformed whereas F and C cannot (for they can); but that A,
which is unmeasurable[now], can be subjected to a transformation,
(2) A 7→ A′ = A+ dλ,
to which C and F are indifferent (despite being functions of A). Whereas it makes
sense to say that “F (orC) is gauge invariant,” the meaning of “A is not gauge invariant”
or “A is gauge dependent” is less clear. Is it meant that A can be transformed? Of
course it can—but so can C and F , and in many different ways: C 7→ C + 7, F 7→ 2F
etc. “A is gauge dependent” may mean something like “C and F , which are functions
a further new interpretation to the potentials. In other words, we are led to regard Aµ(x) as a physical
variable.” See also Feynman et al. (1964) §15-5.
4Cf. Healey (2007) pp. 113-4: “one cannot rule out a future extension of a Yang-Mills gauge theory
that permits observations whose results depend on the existence of a privileged gauge [ . . . ]. If that were
to happen, then his observations would discriminate in favor of an interpretation of the gauge theory that
commits it to such a privileged gauge, and against a holonomy interpretation. This has not yet happened.
But since we cannot be sure that it never will, it seems that we are in no position to answer the question
as to whether a holonomy interpretation is correct.” Belot (1998, footnote 17) seems to countenance the
possibility of physically different but empirically indistinguishable potentials A, A′ ∈ [A]—which makes
the empirical indistinguishability appear particularly contingent, perhaps even temporary. See also Aharonov
& Bohm (1959) p. 491: “we must be able to define the physical difference between two quantum states which
differ only by a gauge transformation” and Healey (2009).
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of A, are measurable, unlike A itself; and A can be subjected to transformations that
leave C and F unchanged.”5 Shorthand I suppose, but not of the clearest sort.
The transformation (2) has to be understood in conjunction with the associated
phase transformation
(3) ψ 7→ eiλψ,
as Leeds (1999) has rightly emphasized. But it remains true that the gauge dependence
of A has above all to be understood in terms of the observability of F and C, and their
indifference to (2). If the λ of (2) & (3) were fixed by measurement (of phase or gauge),
both freedoms would disappear together.
The holonomy interpretation6 of the Aharonov-Bohm effect, which will concern us
here (§3), can be summarized as follows: (1) rules out the reality of A; but the circu-
lation C is indifferent to (1) (or rather (2)); since A isn’t really there, and something
ought to be, the loop(s) σ0 around whichA is integrated to give C is chosen as bearer or
locus of physical reality. Even more briefly: UnlikeA, C is invariant, so σ0 (or perhaps
[σ0]) is real but not A. Healey (2007) p. 51:
If the value of the vector potential Aµ at each space-time point x in
a region does not represent some qualitative intrinsic physical properties
in the vicinity of x, it may be that some function of its integral around
each closed curve C in that region does represent such properties of or
at (the image of) C. [ . . . ] Since the gauge dependence of the vector
potential made it hard to accept Feynman’s view that it is a real field that
acts locally in the Aharonov-Bohm effect, there is reason to hope that a
gauge-invariant function of its line integral around closed curves might
facilitate a local account of the action of electromagnetism on quantum
particles in the Aharonov-Bohm effect and elsewhere.
And p. 105:
The non-localized gauge potential properties view is motivated by the
idea that the structure of gauge potential properties is given by the gauge-
invariant content of a gauge theory. The most direct way to implement this
idea would be to require that the gauge potential properties are just those
5Lyre has it the other way around—the symmetry comes first, A is unmeasurable as a result: (2001)
p. S377 “The Reality of Gauge Potentials. “Only gauge-independent quantities are observable.””; p. S379
“holonomies are gauge-independent quantities and therefore appropriate candidates of observable entities”;
(2002) p. 82 “Der Eichsymmetrie zufolge lassen sich Eichpotentiale nicht direkt beobachten – nur eichinvari-
ante Größen können observabel sein. [ . . . ] In den Eichtheorien sind diejenigen Entitäten, denen aufgrund
observabler Konsequenzen Realstatus zugebilligt werden muß, einerseits klarerweise nur bis auf Eichtrans-
formationen festgelegt [ . . . ].”
6Healey (1997, 2001, 2004, 2007), Belot (1998), Lyre (2001, 2002, 2004a,b); see also Wu&Yang (1975),
Myrvold (2011). The first two letters of “anholonomy” don’t look semantically irrelevant, quite on the
contrary; the “a” looks very much like a transliterated alpha privative, which far from doing nothing at all
would turn “holonomy” into its opposite, “¬ holonomy.” One might imagine that the removal of the initial
“an” would restore the meaning of “holonomy.” Not at all; by a prodigy of language and logic we have
holonomy≡ ¬ holonomy. “Holonomy” is often preferred to its anto-synonym (the French say énantiosème)
“anholonomy.” Whether “holonomy” means “anholonomy” or the opposite is settled by context.
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that are represented by gauge-invariant magnitudes. [ . . . ] While the vec-
tor potential Aµ is gauge dependent, its line integral S(C) =
∮
C
Aµdx
µ
around a closed curve C is gauge invariant.
The point cannot just be that invariance is ontologically relevant, for that goes back7 to
Cassirer (1921) or perhaps Einstein (1916) or even Klein (1872); nor can it be anything
like the world is made of structures or structures should be taken seriously,8 which may
be right but not new, either; nor can it be a mere extension of old ideas (about invariance
or structures) to another theory. The claim, as I take it, is interesting, original, even
spectacular: the world is made of loops (or perhaps loops are ontologically preferable
to potentials). That’s what I contest. Not that structures or transformation properties
can be ontologically relevant, nor that anholonomies are worth bearing in mind.
I argue (§4) as follows: A and σ0 are related by a significant duality, so that how-
ever one feels about the class [A] (or its elements), it is no worse than the hoop9 [σ0]
(or its elements). I’ll think of A as a set {σ1, . . . , σN} of level curves, which can in-
deed be deformed (by (2))—but so can σ0. The deformability of σ1, . . . , σN , or rather
σ0, . . . , σN , is neither here nor there, and shouldn’t be used to rule out the reality of A
in particular.
I also explore (§§5,6) the relationship between the measurability of a quantity (say
A) and the ontic status of a boundary; can the measurement of one entity undermine
the physical reality of another, ferrying it off to a shadier realm of mathematical ab-
stractions?
My arguments are no doubt best applied to the holonomy interpretation within
an appropriate structural realism—which may or may not be the best description of
Healey’s position.
Healey (2007) devotes much attention to quantized non-Abelian Yang-Mills theory.
I only consider electrodynamics—and hence U(1), rather than the non-Abelian struc-
ture groups of Yang-Mills theory—without quantization (beyond the use of a wave-
function).
2 The Aharonov-Bohm effect
A wavefunction is split into two, and these, having enclosed a (simply-connected) re-
gion ω containing a solenoid, are made to interfere on a screen. The enclosing wave-
function is sensitive to any enclosed electromagnetism inasmuch as the electromagnetic
potential A contributes a phase
exp i
∮
∂ω
A
to (the wavefunction along) the boundary ∂ω ≡ σ0 and hence to the interference pattern
on the screen. The electromagnetism on ω is related to the circulation around the
7See Afriat & Caccese (2010) p. 18.
8On structural realism see for instance Poincaré (1902, 1905), Cassirer (1921), Russell (1927), Worrall
(1989), French & Ladyman (2003), French (2006).
9This is the class of loops going around the solenoid once (and no more).
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boundary by Stokes’s theorem
C =
∮
∂ω
A =
∫∫
ω
dA.
The electromagnetic field10 F = dA produced by the solenoid is confined11 to a middle
region µ ⊂ ω surrounded by an isolating region12 µ′ = ω − µ where F vanishes but
not A.
Varying the current through the solenoid changes the arbitrarily distant interference
pattern, which is surprising.
3 The reality of loops
The electromagnetic field F and inverse image [A] = d−1F are measurable, but not the
individual potential13 A—which may therefore be physically meaningless, on its own
at any rate. But surely the Aharonov-Bohm effect has to be conveyed by something.
If the potential isn’t really there, what’s left? The solenoid, and the electromagnetic
field it contains, are (arbitrarily) far from the wavefunction and the screen on which
the effect is seen. The circulation C, which determines the interference pattern, has
a promising indifference14 to (2); but C is just a number, not enough on its own to
convey or account for the effect—something more is presumably sought. The number
is obtained by integrating any15 A ∈ [A] around any σ0 ∈ [σ0]; having ruled out A,16
10It is perhaps easiest to think of F as a purely magnetic fieldB produced by the current density J = d∗B
in the solenoid.
11Mattingly (2007) argues that the magnetic field is present on the annulus µ′, since its many components
are. Indeed they cancel by addition, but one can wonder about the physical meaning of the sum.
12It will be convenient to view µ and ω as concentric disks.
13But see §7.
14Healey (1997) p. 34: “since S(C) is gauge-invariant, it may readily be considered a physically real
quantity.”
15To stress the ontic and conceptual autonomy of loops, Healey (2007, pp. 72-3—and perhaps Lyre too)
would rather think of a holonomy as a number assigned to a loop than as the integral of a potential around
a loop: loops can do without potentials. But can they? How does one know what number the loop gets?
But suppose one works out the circulation by integration, then forgets about the original potential A—all
that’s remembered is the number C and its loop(s). Even if such associations underdetermine the individual
potential A, they determine the equivalence class [A] (see Anandan (1983), Barrett (1991), Healey (2004)
pp. 626-7). So potentials are never too far away, and cannot be completely divorced from holonomies. See
Healey (2001) p. 447.
16Lyre (2001) p. S377, Lyre (2004b) p. 665: “realists can hardly be satisfied by the gauge dependence
of entities as imminent in the A-interpretation [ . . . ].” Healey (1997) p. 22: “there is reason to doubt that
the magnetic vector potential is a physically real field, since A is not gauge-invariant, unlike the magnetic
field B [ . . . ].” Healey (1999) p. 445, Healey (2001) pp. 435-6, 454, Healey (2007) pp. 25-6, pp. 55-6:
“If there are new localized gauge properties, then neither theory nor experiment gives us a good grasp on
them. Theoretically, the best we can do is to represent them either by a mathematical object chosen more or
less arbitrarily from a diverse and infinite class of formally similar objects related to one another by gauge
transformations, or else by this entire gauge-equivalence class” and p. 118. Healey’s claim that theory itself
(rather than experimental limitations) rules out a choice of gauge is answered (by himself) in footnote 4
above. Cf. Maudlin (1998) pp. 366-7, Leeds (1999) p. 610, Mattingly (2006) p. 251, Healey (2009) p. 707:
“It is especially hard when it is the theory itself that provides our only initial access to those features of
situations it represents by newly introduced structures—hard, but not impossible.”
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Healey (2001),17 Lyre (2001),18 Lyre (2004a),19 Lyre (2004b)20 and Healey (2007)21
attribute reality to σ0 (or [σ0]) instead.22
α : Since C, unlike A, is indifferent to (2), A isn’t real but σ0 (or [σ0]) is.
17P. 448: “it is the holonomies that represent the real physical structures in a gauge situation, rather than
any particular bundle connection that is compatible with them.” P. 449: “What is distinctive is not the
properties represented by holonomies but the nature of the object whose properties they are. On the present
view, holonomies represent global properties of a loop that are not determined by any intrinsic properties of
the points on that loop.” A holonomy is a pair 〈σ0,C〉; it is hard to see how a loop and a number can be real
without the loop itself being real.
18P. S379: “We [ . . . ] should consider holonomies as physically real.” P. S380: “We may very well
represent the physically significant structures in an ontological universe consisting of matter-fields, gauge
field strengths, and holonomies.”
19P. 116: “Die Entitäten der Eichtheorien sind Holonomien [ . . . ].”
20P. 665-6: “we may still consider holonomies as object-like entities, but to such an extent that our notion
of an object becomes highly abstract.” P. 667: “When we stick to more abstract and non-local entities we
do not dismiss the notion of objects altogether. [ . . . ] A third “intermediate” possibility would be to stick
with more abstract but still measurable or, as some authors like to phrase it, “structural” objects—and here
non-separable holonomies turn ou a suitable case at hand. [ . . . ] a more sustained conclusion should perhaps
rather be seen in the development of modern physics into more abstract—here spatiotemporally holistic—
entities in accordance with an intermediate version of structural realism—less radical than the ontic version
but more directly supported from science than the epistemic one.” Lyre (p. 658) sees holonomies as “basic
entities” and “genuine entities.”
21P. xviii: “In the simplest case (classical electromagnetism interacting with quantum particles) such an
account ascribes properties to (or on) a loop of empty space that are not fixed by properties of anything
located at points around the loop [ . . . ].” P. 30: “Suppose instead that one takes the holonomies themselves
directly to represent electromagnetism and its effects on quantum particles.” P. 31: “But if the holonomies
directly represent electromagnetism and its effects, then there is still a sense in which the action of elec-
tromagnetism on the electrons is not completely local, since holonomies attach to extended curves rather
than points.” P. 56: “only gauge-invariant functions of these mathematically localized fields directly repre-
sent new electromagnetic properties; and these are predicated of, or at, arbitrarily small neighborhoods of
loops in space-time—i.e. oriented images of closed curves on the space-time manifold.” P. 74: “This makes
it plausible to maintain that what an SU(2) Yang-Mills theory ultimately describes is not a localized field
represented by a gauge potential, but a set of intrinsic properties of what I have simply called loops [ . . . ].”
P. 106: “we arrive at the view that non-localized EM potential properties in a region are represented by the
holonomies [ . . . ] of all closed curves in the region [ . . . ]. This is the interpretation of classical electromag-
netism I shall defend.” P. 118: “One can reformulate the theory as a theory of holonomy properties, so that
it does not even appear to mention localized gauge potential properties.” P. 185: “gauge potentials directly
represent no localized gauge properties, but rather indirectly represent non-localized holonomy properties.”
P. 220: “[ . . . ] the Aharonov-Bohm effect and other related effects provide vivid examples of physical pro-
cesses that seem best accounted for in terms of non-localized holonomy properties [ . . . ].” P. 221: “Should
we believe that non-separable processes involving non-localized holonomy properties are responsible for
phenomena like the Aharonov-Bohm effect? This belief may be encouraged by the predictive successes
consequent upon introducing classical electromagnetism into the quantum mechanics of particles.” P. 225:
“This reinforces the conclusion that the evidence for contemporary gauge theories lends credence to the be-
lief that these describe non-separable processes, while nothing in the world corresponds to or is represented
by a locally defined gauge potential.” And the last paragraph of the book pp. 227-8.
22Belot (2003) p. 216 has a similar position—without, however, going so far as to claim that loops aremore
real: “holonomies [ . . . ] are well-defined quantities on the spaces of states of the standard formulations of
Yang-Mills theories. If it is accepted that these theories describe reality, does not it follow that the quantities
in question are as real as any others?” See also Belot (1998) p. 544: “we must also consider closed curves in
space to be carriers of the electromagnetic predicates” and the final paragraph pp. 553-4.
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4 Duality between loops and potentials
But there is a significant duality between loops and potentials: just as a vector σ˙′0(x) ∈
TxM and a covector A(x) from the dual space T ∗xM give a number 〈A(x), σ˙
′
0(x)〉,
the loop23 σ0 ≡ ∂ω and potential give a number (A, σ0) = C. Both A and σ0 can be
deformed without affecting the circulation: the potential according to (2); a loop can be
deformed into any other loop going around the solenoid once. Both could be replaced
by their equivalence classes [A] and [σ0], one could even write ([A], [σ0]) = C.
It will be useful to understand the transformation (2) more geometrically, as a de-
formation of the level sets of A’s local primitive24 σ.25 One can first imagine a purely
‘angular’ or ‘radial’ σ (with values running from zero to 2πk = C),26 whose level lines
are straight rays radiating through the annulus µ′ from the inner disk µ to the edge ∂ω.
A gauge transformation (2) would then deform the level rays, bending them without
making them cross. It is easier to picture the denumerable set {σ1, . . . , σN} of level
curves at intervals of C/N than all of them; they will each be cut once27 by any loop
σ0 going around the solenoid once.
In this construction we haveN + 1 deformable curves σ0, . . . , σN , which all seem
pretty much on the same footing; α amounts to the surprising claim that
α′ : Only σ0 is real because the other curves σ1, . . . , σN can be deformed.
Why should one curve σk be any better than the others? How about σ7? It remains true
that σ0, . . . , σ6, σ8, . . . , σN can be deformed.
To emphasise that loops are no better than A, we can even arrange for a gauge
transformation to induce a loop deformation (thus strengthening the duality): Level
rays of unit length determine a unit circle, which will then be ‘deflated’ into a smaller
loop by a gauge transformation (2); to every such transformation there corresponds a
different loop σλ0 . If a potential subject to (2) is too flimsy to exist, how can loops also
subject to (2) be any better? Are vectors any more real than the covectors dual to them?
Is a Lagrangian any less real than the Hamiltonian dual to it? Does momentum exist
more than velocity?
5 Vertical drop
Suppose I can only measure the curl F = dA of my garden’s gradient28 (or infinites-
imal vertical drop) A but not the gradient itself—some instruments and experimental
23The one-dimensional manifold σ0 ⊂ M is the image of the mapping σ′0 : I → M ; t 7→ σ
′
0
(t),
without its parameter t, which is not part of the boundary ∂ω (where I ⊂ R is an interval and the manifold
M an appropriate base space).
24For wherever A is closed it can be written locally as the gradient A = dσ of a zero-form σ.
25A similar construction is used in Afriat (2013).
26Such a σ cannot be continuous everywhere; we can imagine a single discontinuity, say on the ray with
values σ = 2πnk, where the integer n is zero then one, k = C/2π being a constant.
27One should really say an odd number of times, as Jean-Philippe Nicolas has pointed out to me. Crossings
in opposite directions cancel, and add nothing to the integral.
28Needless to say, most gardens have an exact gradient.
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possibilities are available, others aren’t.29 The indifference of F = dA + d2λ to the
exact one-form dλ can accordingly be called a gauge freedom. The vertical drop or
rather circulation
C =
∮
∂ω
A =
∫∫
ω
dA
is also indifferent to (2), where ∂ω is the boundary of any region ω.
The unmeasurability[in an appropriate part of space-time] of A makes my garden
an awkward tangle of real physical loops by producing the gauge freedomwhich in turn
invests the boundary ∂ω (or [∂ω]) with physical reality. But to dispatch the loops to
the shady regions (populated by innocuous mathematical ghosts) where they obstruct
neither gardening nor evening strolls it may be enough to work out how to measure A;
for that could change the status of (2) and hence of the loops.30
We know that peeking can kill a cat (Schrödinger, 1935); but here, peeking at a
gradient may well carry off a loop!
6 Electrostatics, gravity
The solenoid, or perhaps the field F = dA it produces, is a source whose ‘radiation’A
is caught by the boundary ∂ω.
In electrostatics the source is a charge density three-form ρ = dE, which radiates
the electric two-form E caught by the two-dimensional boundary ∂Ω of a region Ω
containing ρ. Stokes’s theorem again holds, and allows us to write
F =
∫∫
∂Ω
E =
∫∫∫
Ω
dE =
∫∫∫
Ω
ρ.
The difference here is that ρ’s primitive E is measurable, and fixed by the condition
E = ∗dϕ (the electrostatic potential ϕ being a zero-form). But F and ρ can nonetheless
be called ‘gauge invariant,’ in the sense that they’re indifferent to the gauge transfor-
mation
(4) E 7→ E′ = E+ dβ,
where dβ is the curl of a one-form β.
But this gauge invariancemay seem purely formal, vacuous, meaningless. To take it
more seriously one would have to forget how to measureE.31 OnceE is unmeasurable,
(4) will acquire a different status, and so will the boundary ∂Ω. If we then feel trapped
inside an infinite gauge-invariant class [∂Ω] of real physical membranes, it may be
enough, to dissolve them all, to remember how to measure E.
29Again, there can be other instruments and experimental possibilities in other space-time regions; a notion
of experimental possibility may or may not propagate from one region to another.
30It may look as though I am affirming the consequent; [unmeasurable potential]⇒[real boundary] does
not on its own imply [measurable potential]⇒[unreal boundary]. But it seems natural to assume that mathe-
matical boundaries are merely mathematical, unless we have reason to believe they’re not. Such a reason—
“A is gauge dependent”—is exactly what Healey and Lyre provide. If that reason ceases to hold, however,
the departure from the natural assumption is no longer justified.
31It is by no means impossible to make a quantity unmeasurable; one can destroy instruments, abolish
know-how, banish specialists and so on. Measurability is as reversible as progress.
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The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to Newton-Poisson gravity, where ρ is the
mass density, ϕ the gravitational potential etc.32
The same also applies to the Aharonov-Bohm effect itself: Suppose an ingenious
experimenter works out how to measure A. That would change the status of (2)—
it would be taken less seriously—and hence of ∂ω, which would undergo an ontic
transition. We have something like a ‘law of ontological conservation’: if the reality
isn’t here (A), and it has to be somewhere, it must be there (∂ω); but if it is here, it no
longer has to be there . . .
7 Liénard-Wiechert
Mattingly (2006) has convincingly argued that the Liénard-Wiechert potentialAl ∈ [A]
is privileged, and should be taken seriously for various reasons; but one can even go so
far as to claim it is observable. It is defined with respect to a quantity, the four-current-
density j, which is as real, observable and well-behaved as one could wish. Expressing
the one-form (field) Al as the value Al = Lj of an appropriate linear operator L :
Λ3(M ) → Λ1(M ) transforming three-form fields on (flat) spacetime into one-form
fields on spacetime, everything will turn on the nature of L—which propagates the
covector33 Al(x′) = ∗j(x)/‖x′ − x‖ along (all points x′ of) the future light cone
of the current j(x) at x, where ∗ is the Hodge dual. If L seems artificial, arbitrary
and contrived, j will no more ‘yield’ Al than it yields many other quantities obtained
from j through equally artificial operations. But if L seems so simple, natural and
appropriate that it acquires an air of ‘uniqueness,’ it will indeed yield Al; the (theory
laden) observability of Al would then follow from the unquestionable observability of
j. For once the theory-ladenness of observation (together with the underdetermination
of theory by the evidence) has been accepted, the observation of any quantity—A or
F or P or ψ—will necessarily involve theoretical choices and stipulations. L is a
stipulation differing at most (and not excessively) in degree, but in any case not in
kind, from theoretical (often tacit) conventions of which even the best physics is full.
Will the reality of loops depend on the way one feels aboutL? I re-readMattingly’s
paper this morning, and found it even more convincing; L seemed especially appropri-
ate; were the universe’s loops thereby condemned to ontic degradation? But perhaps
such degradations are a matter of social, rather than individual, psychology; and the
full weight and authority of communities is needed to capture truths, inaccessible to
individuals, about observability . . .
8 Geometric potential
Another approach—not really my main argument—would be to represent the potential
(or connection) at a higher level of abstraction, at which the ontologically trouble-
some gauge freedom (2) disappears, leaving only a geometrical structure (horizontal
32See Afriat (2013).
33The ‘length’ ‖ · ‖ is purely spatial, being the modulus ‖V ‖ =
√
g(PV,PV ) of a spacelike projection
PV of the argument V . Here I am indebted to Jean-Philippe Nicolas.
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distribution on the principal bundle34) that corresponds to [A] but not to A, which it
underdetermines.35 If one is burdened with A and (2) and their ontological implica-
tions one has simply chosen the wrong way of thinking about potentials, the wrong
level of abstraction, encumbered as it is by confusing and irrelevant clutter that just
gets in the way.36 Needless to say, the higher level of abstraction only makes sense as
long as the individual potential A remains empirically inaccessible . . .
9 Final remarks
Picking a potential A out of [A] is admittedly problematic37 (as long as A remains
unmeasurable). But picking a loop σ0 out of the hoop [σ0] is just as bad. There are
indeed reasons to prefer [A] to any particular potential A, and to prefer [σ0] to any
particular loop σ0; but those reasons are not good reasons to prefer [σ0] to [A], or
any particular σ0 to any particular A; nor are they good reasons to prefer [σ0] to any
particular A (or [A], for that matter, to any particular σ0).
Healey and Lyre attribute reality to loops because potentials are subject to (onto-
logically disturbing) arbitrary choices. I have argued in §4 that potentials are no more
subject to arbitrary choices than loops; in §8 it may even appear that potentials are less
subject to such choices. The ‘gauge freedom’ of potentials is due to their unmeasura-
bility, about which I have raised questions in §§5-7. It is remarkable that the unmea-
surability of a differential form ζ defined on Ω should confer physical reality on the
boundary ∂Ω. If the ‘potential’ represented by ζ sooner or later becomes measurable,
does the ontic status of the boundary ∂Ω weaken?
I thank Jean-Philippe Nicolas for valuable clarifications and corrections, Silvia De
Bianchi for her suggestions, and Dimitri Kasprzyk for telling me about énantiosèmes.
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